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Although pretend play has long been linked to children’s normative cognitive
development, inconsistent findings call for greater rigor in examining this relation (Lillard
et al., 2013). Spontaneous pretend play is often impacted in atypical development,
notably in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Since ASD traits exist along a continuum in
the general population, investigating how pretend play varies across the range of ASD
symptoms by indexing variations in ASD traits in both typically developing and ASD
populations may provide insight into how ASD symptoms may influence the relation
between pretend play and associated processes in cognitive development. This study
used rigorous observational methods to assess spontaneous pretend play. Specifically,
5-min free-play sessions with two discrete toy sets were double-coded by blinded
coders (coder assignment counterbalanced). Key facets of pretense development
[attribution of pretend properties (APP), object substitution (OS), imaginary objects] were
examined. These facets of pretend play production were then analyzed in relation to ASD
symptoms, as well as plausible, long-theorized correlates [theory of mind (ToM), verbal
ability, familiarity, and interest in specific toys]. Forty children (Mage = 6;5, SDage = 1.45;
29 males), six of whom met the threshold for ASD diagnosis via parent-reported ASD
symptoms, participated in play sessions and completed measures of verbal IQ and
ToM. Besides the measure of child ASD symptoms, parents completed a survey of
their child’s interest in and familiarity with the play session toys. Overall, greater ToM
predicted more APP, and more interest in the toys presented predicted more OS. In
terms of overall pretend play production, two results were counterintuitive. First, among
children with more ASD symptoms, verbal ability marginally negatively predicted pretend
play production. Second, among children with fewer ASD symptoms, ToM negatively
predicted pretend play production. Further probing revealed that the negative effect of
ASD symptoms on pretend play was simultaneously moderated by both variables: low
ToM and high verbal ability both related to less pretend play production among children
with more ASD symptoms. Implications for assessment and subsequent treatment for
pretend ability among children with varying degrees of ASD symptoms, as well as for
future research, are discussed.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, spontaneous pretend play, assessment, cognitive development,
observational coding
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INTRODUCTION
Play is a common feature of childhood. While exploring the world
around them, children begin to play with everyday objects (e.g.,
pots and pans), more typical objects (e.g., dolls and toy cars),
and eventually with their peers. By the time they are 3 years
old, most typically developing (TD) children independently and
spontaneously engage in symbolic or pretend play, such as
pretending a banana is a telephone (Lillard, 2015). Pretend play
is a combination of play and pretense, or the “stretching (of)
one reality over another” (Lillard, 1993). The ability to pretend
requires a metarepresentational ability, or the ability to hold onto
two mental representations in the mind (Leslie, 1987; Lillard,
1993). The first reflects the state of the real world, or the perceived
situation (e.g., here is a cup, the cup is empty), and the second
reflects the pretend situation (e.g., this cup that is really empty
contains tea; Leslie, 1987) that the pretender needs to be able to
map onto the contexts of the real world.
Although, increasingly sophisticated pretend naturally
emerges in TD children in their second year of life (Haight and
Miller, 1993), the development of pretend appears impaired for
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) children, even for those who are
“high-functioning” with intact verbal ability (Jarrold, 2003). Even
though children with ASD might pretend less and differently,
research consistently suggests that many children with ASD do
still pretend (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Libby et al., 1998; Rutherford
and Rogers, 2003). According to Jarrold (2003), individuals with
ASD may have an underlying capacity to understand pretend, but
fail to engage in spontaneous pretend. Several studies showing
individuals with ASD as on par with controls at predicting the
result of pretend sequences support the proposition of intact
pretense comprehension in the ASD population (Jarrold et al.,
1994; Kavanaugh and Harris, 1994).
In order to understand how pretend play varies across the
range of ASD symptoms, it is useful to index variations in
ASD traits in both TD and ASD populations (Russell-Smith
et al., 2012), as ASD traits exist along a continuum in the
general population (Constantino and Todd, 2003; Best et al.,
2008). However, to date, little research has examined whether
differences in pretend play production vary as a function of
ASD symptoms dimensionally across TD and ASD populations.
The sole exception is a recent study by Campbell et al. (2016),
which found a negative correlation between ASD symptom
severity and pretend play in toddlers. Moreover, little work has
carefully explored the factors that contribute to spontaneous
pretend among children with varying levels of ASD symptoms,
the consideration of which will help better illuminate the factors
that contribute to the development of the ability to pretend in
children.
In addition to assessing how ASD symptoms might contribute
to the ability to produce pretend, it is important to examine
how various factors might directly influence different subtypes
of pretend. Actions of pretend play often fall under one of three
categories (Leslie, 1987): object substitution (OS; e.g., pretending
a block is a car), attribution of pretend properties (APP; e.g.,
pretending dishes are dirty), and imaginary objects (IO; e.g.,
pretending to read a book when there is no book present). A small
body of research suggests that it is not pretend as a whole, but
certain types of pretend that are more challenging for individuals
with ASD. For instance, Libby et al. (1998) demonstrated that
children with ASD produced just as much OS as TD children,
but produced significantly fewer acts of APP and IO, resulting
in fewer acts of overall pretend compared to TD children. It is
plausible that each of these categories of pretend may require
slightly different child capacities and experiences (e.g., knowledge
and understanding that a doll represents a human might lead
a child to attribute the pretend property of talking, whereas
knowledge and understanding that a doll is a vertical object that
you can bang against things might lead a child to engage in
OS and substitute the doll for a hammer), and may therefore
represent categorically different styles of pretend play. Thus,
assessing how certain predictors might influence pretend ability
as a whole, as well as subtypes of pretend, may provide deeper
insight into which elements of pretend (and associated mental
representations) might contribute to difficulties with pretend
among individuals with ASD. Moreover, researchers have not yet
explored whether differences of pretend play subtypes produced
would be evident among TD individuals with varying levels of
ASD symptoms.
Associations between pretend play, ToM, and verbal ability
are frequently found (Astington and Jenkins, 1995, 1999;
Jenkins and Astington, 1996, 2000; Taylor and Carlson, 1997;
Lewis et al., 2000; Bigham, 2010). Crucially, however, current
research does not strongly support causal relations between
engaging in pretend actions and the development of perspective-
taking [theory of mind (ToM); Dore et al., 2015] and other
developmental domains in TD children, calling for a greater rigor
in clarifying relations of pretend play and these domains (Lillard
et al., 2013). Therefore, carefully examining such links are helpful
in understanding how pretend play normally develops, and how
children with ASD symptoms might pretend differently.
ToM is the ability to understand others’ mental states and
how other individuals might perceive the world (Leslie, 1987;
Baron-Cohen, 1995; Wellman, 2014). Taylor and Carlson (1997)
found a link between ToM ability and individual differences in
pretend among TD children, suggesting that TD children with
greater ToM ability may be able to produce more actions of
pretend. These findings have since been supported longitudinally
(Jenkins and Astington, 2000). That is, the ability to understand
others’ perspectives may facilitate a greater ability to understand
and produce pretend play. More recent evidence suggest that
a third variable underpinning both ToM and pretend play,
such as a more general symbolic capacity, may account for the
link between ToM and pretend play (Lillard and Kavanaugh,
2014).
However, many individuals with ASD have difficulty
understanding and interpreting others’ mental states (Baron-
Cohen, 1995, 2001). Concurrently, while some children with
ASD understand others’ actions of pretend, they still struggle
to produce pretend (Jarrold, 2003). One explanation for these
impaired abilities (ToM and pretend) among individuals with
ASD might reflect difficulty in a symbolic substrate that underlies
both pretend play and ToM development (e.g., Lillard and
Kavanaugh, 2014).
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Although, research supports a link between production of
pretend and ToM ability (Taylor and Carlson, 1997) among
TD children, this might represent a pathway typically used by
TD individuals, and less often used by individuals with ASD.
This might be because ToM appears not to develop organically
among individuals with ASD. Instead, individuals with ASD may
deliberately engage in a “hacked together” ToM, rather than
intuitively engaging in a more “automatic” ToM (Dissanayake
and Macintosh, 2003). The hacking hypothesis explains how
individuals with high functioning ASD may pass ToM tasks
via this less efficient, more deliberate route. Furthermore, those
with ASD may engage in a “hacked together” ToM by learning
specific rules that allow them to pass ToM tasks, rather than
using social understanding and an understanding of other’s
perspectives (Dissanayake and Macintosh, 2003). Given that
intuitive, “automatic” ToM might not develop naturally among
those with ASD, it is plausible that the presence of ASD symptoms
may weaken the relation between ToM and pretend production.
On the other hand, pretend comprehension does appear to be
related to ToM when considered among a large group of children
including those with ASD, TD children, and children with
intellectual disabilities (IDs; Bigham, 2010). However, pretense
comprehension bears no relation to pretend production in TD
children (Lillard and Kavanaugh, 2014). While Bigham’s (2010)
findings suggest that ToM ability is linked to understanding
pretend among individuals with ASD, no research has explored
whether this link also exists when looking at the production of
spontaneous pretend among this population. Additionally, no
one has directly tested whether there would be a weaker relation
between ToM ability and pretend play among individuals with
more ASD symptoms compared to those with fewer symptoms.
Furthermore, little research has explored differences in subtypes
of pretend in relation to ToM ability.
A second suggested link with pretend play among TD children
is with verbal ability (Lewis et al., 2000; Rutherford and Rogers,
2003; Bigham, 2010). Lewis et al. (2000) looked at the relation
between language and pretend ability among verbal and non-
verbal TD participants and assessed OS, APP, and IO. Lewis
et al.’s (2000) findings indicated a relation between pretend play
and language development. In addition, longitudinal studies have
suggested that play and language may be developmentally related
(e.g., Ungerer and Sigman, 1984; McCune, 1995; Lillard and
Kavanaugh, 2014).
On the other hand, although verbal mental age seems to
be correlated with pretend play production for both TD and
children with other developmental disabilities (DDs) than ASD,
such relation is not found in children with ASD (Rutherford and
Rogers, 2003). This suggests that the link between verbal ability
and pretend might be a pathway typically used by TD individuals
and individuals with other DD, but one that individuals with
ASD are less able to access. Individuals with ASD might be
less able to access this pathway due to developmental deficits
in communication, a diagnostic feature required for having an
ASD (DSM-5, 2013). Similarly, those with more ASD symptoms
might also experience some deficits in communication that make
this pathway between verbal ability and pretend less accessible.
Furthermore, given Rutherford and Rogers’s (2003) findings,
one might predict that the relation between verbal ability and
pretend would be weaker among TD children with greater levels
of ASD symptoms; however, this has not been directly tested.
Additionally, little research has explored differences in subtypes
of pretend in relation to verbal ability.
If children with ASD are less able to use more typical pathways
to pretend, like ToM and verbal ability, it is possible that
individuals with ASD that are able to pretend use alternate
pathways. Different factors may predict patterns of pretend
in youth with ASD relative to TD and reflect the divergent
developmental pathways used by children with ASD and TD
children to arrive at the ability to produce actions of pretend. Two
plausible factors are interest in and experience (familiarity) with
specific toys. Although research studies have measured familiarity
and interest to control for these factors when evaluating the
effectiveness of pretend play interventions for youth with ASD
(Murdock and Hobbs, 2010), little research has examined them
as predictors of pretend play.
A child’s interest in an object can be characterized by
repeated voluntary engagement with that object, with no outside
encouragement (Hidi et al., 2004; DeLoache et al., 2007). As
children explore different ways that they can interact with and
play with those toys due to personal interest, pretend is one
type of play that might result from repeatedly engaging with
toys. Research has demonstrated that interest appears to drive
and motivate the behaviors in which TD individuals choose to
engage and the objects with which they chose to play (Hidi
et al., 2004). However, these motivational aspects might play a
minimal role in driving the pretend behavior of TD children,
given pretending’s robust and seemingly spontaneous emergence
in most TD children by the age of three (Lillard, 1993).
Presence of restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests,
or activities is a core feature of ASD (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 2013). Given that specialized interests (e.g., in
toys or topics) are more common among ASD individuals (Baker
et al., 1998; Vismara and Lyons, 2007), interest and motivation
may play an especially crucial role in the play behaviors of youth
with ASD (Koegel and Mentis, 1985). Even though children with
ASD have been shown to engage in fewer actions of pretend
and different subtypes of pretend (Libby et al., 1998), interest in
objects might play an important role in initiating the actions of
spontaneous pretend that these children can and do produce by
motivating a child with ASD to repeatedly engage in actions of
play with that toy. Due to a personal interest in a specific toy,
children with ASD may have played with that toy frequently and
already have an understanding of the typical functions of the toy.
Hence, they might be more readily able to try out novel uses with
it, such as pretend play. Such experiences may, in turn, facilitate
basic metarepresentational capacities in a child with ASD.
Furthermore, familiarity with an object might also facilitate a
child with ASD to produce actions of pretend. A child’s level of
familiarity with an object is based on how often that child has
seen or been exposed to that object (Hidi et al., 2004). The more
children (either TD or ASD) are exposed to a certain object, the
better they apperceive the characteristics of that object. Perhaps it
is easier for a child with ASD to go beyond the percept to attribute
abstract (pretend) characteristics to an object once they become
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more familiar with it. Conversely, as some youth with ASD tend
to engage in repetitive behavioral routines with familiar objects
(Leekam et al., 2011), they may in fact be more likely to engage
in novel play routines (e.g., pretend) with less familiar objects.
In this sense, familiarity could be seen to relate to more or less
pretend in this population; crucially, though, it could plausibly
be more related to pretend production in ASD relative to TD
children.
Despite the proposed relation of interest in and familiarity
with objects to spontaneous pretend play, and the theorized
differences in this relation between TD and ASD youth,
no previous research has explored this connection directly.
Furthermore, no research has explored differences in subtypes of
pretend in relation to interest in and familiarity with toys.
Using rigorous observational methods to assess spontaneous
pretend play, the current study examined the relation between
overall quantity and well-established subtypes of pretend play
(OS, APP, and IO) spontaneously produced by TD and ASD
children and measures of ASD symptoms, verbal ability, ToM,
and interest in and familiar with presented toys. We hypothesized
that (1) children reported to have more ASD symptoms would
engage in less spontaneous pretend play overall, fewer acts of APP
and IO, and comparable levels of OS relative to those with fewer
ASD symptoms (Libby et al., 1998). Second, we hypothesized
that (2a) both well-established (verbal ability and ToM) and
novel (interest and familiarity) predictors of pretend would
relate positively to overall pretend play. We also considered sub-
hypotheses regarding the relation between ToM, verbal ability,
and interest and familiarity, and subtypes of pretend. Given Libby
et al.’s (1998) finding that individuals with ASD produced fewer
acts of APP and IO, and the conjecture that certain pathways
to pretend might be less (ToM and verbal ability) or more
(interest and familiarity) accessible to individuals with more ASD
symptoms, we hypothesized that (2b) better ToM and verbal
ability would relate to more instances of APP and IO and that
more interest in and familiarity with the presented toys would
relate to more instances of OS. Furthermore, we hypothesized
that (3a) ToM and verbal ability would show stronger relations
to pretend quantity among individuals with fewer reported ASD
symptoms compared to those with more symptoms. In a sub-
hypothesis, we hypothesized that (3b) better ToM and verbal
ability would result in more instances of APP and IO for
those with fewer ASD symptoms. Finally, we hypothesized that
(4a) levels of familiarity and interest in presented toys would
show stronger relations to pretend quantity among individuals
reported to have more ASD symptoms compared to those with
fewer symptoms. In a sub-hypothesis, we hypothesized that (4b)
more interest in and familiarity with the presented toys would
result in more instances of OS for those with more symptoms of
ASD compared to those with fewer symptoms.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were thirty-four TD children (Mage = 6;1,
SDage = 2.0; 23 males) and six with ASD (Mage = 5;2, SDage = 1.0;
six males). Participants were recruited using the University of
Virginia Babypool database, which is comprised of names
and numbers of local Charlottesville families willing to be
contacted to participate in research (see Table 1 for demographic
information). This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of University of Virginia Institutional Review
Board for the Social and Behavioral Sciences, with written
informed consent from parents of all subjects.
Procedure
Each participant completed two visits. During their first visit,
participants completed a measure of cognitive ability, including
verbal ability (the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test 2; KBIT-2;
Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004). Parents completed a measure
of ASD symptoms throughout their child’s development [Social
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ); Rutter et al., 2005],
a standard developmental history form, and a questionnaire
regarding their child’s experience with and interest in specific
toys.
At the beginning of the second visit (usually completed by
the same research assistant as visit 1), ToM measure(s) were
administered, followed by two 5-min free-play sessions with toys.
One play session involved a set of six conventional objects (toy
car, female doll, male doll, pan, spoon, and bowl) and the other
involved a set of six “junk” objects (piece of string, piece of
cardboard, butter tub, margarine tub, empty spool, and empty
matchbox), consistent with the work of Libby et al.’s (1998)
study. Both conventional and junk objects were used given that
“high structured” conventional objects have been shown to elicit
more pretend play than “low structured” junk objects (McLoyd,
1983). Having both toy sets allowed for gathering more data
regarding how children pretend with different toys, and allowed
for estimation of each child’s “average” spontaneous pretending
across situations that may tend to elicit more or less pretense. The
order in which object sets were presented was randomized.
TABLE 1 | Participant descriptive statistics (N = 40).
Variable Mean (SD) Range
Age 5.98 (1.46) 4.00–8.92
Sex 29 male
Overall IQ 116.58 (15.46) 58–141
Social Communication Questionnaire 6.38 (7.12) 0–26
Verbal IQ 113.68 (15.17) 86–138
ToM 6.50 (3.56) 0–13
Familiarity 3.79 (0.57) 2.67–4.83
Interest 2.68 (0.66) 1.75–4.33
No Play 6.91 (4.13) 0.25–15.75
Non-Symbolic Play 8.93 (3.32) 3.25–16.25
Pretend Play 4.11 (3.45) 0–12.25
Pretend Play – Object Substitution 0.84 (1.22) 0–6.75
Pretend Play – Attribution of Pretend Properties 2.10 (3.05) 0–11.75
Pretend Play – Imaginary Objects 1.24 (2.41) 0–10.25
ToM = Combined Theory of Mind score (Theory of Mind Scale plus Strange
Stories).
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When introducing a toy set, the six objects were arranged in a
semicircle around the child, ensuring that each toy had an equal
opportunity of being selected (Servin et al., 1999). While placing
the toys, the research assistant recited the following script (similar
to McLoyd, 1983; Baron-Cohen, 1987): “I have some work to
finish up. I will be back in a few minutes. Here, are some toys
for you to play with while I’m working. You can do anything
you like with them.” After 5 min of free-play with the first set of
objects, the next set was introduced in the same manner, and the
procedure repeated. All play sessions were videotaped to allow
for independent blinded subsequent coding of play content by
separate raters.
Measures
SCQ (Rutter et al., 2005)
This parent-report questionnaire is a widely used screener
for ASD. This measure examines the presence or absence
of specific ASD symptoms across a child’s development thus
far, and was used to compare ASD symptom levels across
participants. The subscales of the SCQ are reciprocal interactions
(example item: Does your child have any particular friends
or a best friend?), communication (example item: Did your
child ever spontaneously point at things around him/her just
to show you things [not because she/he wanted them]?), and
restrictive repetitive behaviors (example item: Did your child
seem unusually interested in the sight, feel, sound, taste, or smell
of things or people?; Rutter et al., 2005). These subscales represent
the three core deficits among individuals with ASD. SCQ scores
can range from 0 to 40 and scores above the threshold of 15
suggest a high likelihood of meeting criteria for ASD.
Theory of Mind Scale (ToM Scale; Wellman and Liu,
2004)
This ToM Scale was used, because it is a standardized instrument
designed to measure ToM development among TD individuals
up through the mental age of 5 (Peterson et al., 2005). To
maximize the sensitivity of these scales to diverse forms of ToM
we used the original six-items version. The scale is comprised of
six tasks, with each task increasing in level of difficulty. The tasks
are: diverse desires, diverse beliefs, knowledge access, contents
false belief, explicit false belief, and real-apparent emotion
(Wellman and Liu, 2004). All six tasks were administered due
to the finding that no task alone can account for the progressive
development of ToM capabilities (Wellman and Liu, 2004).
Participants were awarded zero points for incorrect answers and
one point for correct. Total points awarded could range from
0 to 6.
Strange Stories (Happé, 1994)
This advanced ToM battery is able to effectively measure ToM
capabilities among TD individuals ranging in age from 5 to
12 years old (O’Hare et al., 2009). There were 10 stories, nine of
which were measures of ToM ability, and one was a control story
that only asked questions regarding physical events to ensure that
there was no comprehension deficit. The stories were either read
aloud to the participant by the experimenter or the child read
the story aloud. Administration of Strange Stories allowed for
a deeper examination of a child’s ToM development by looking
at whether or not the child was able to provide mental state
explanations for why a story’s character might have acted a certain
way (Happé, 1994). In order to test for higher levels of ToM,
Strange Stories was administered to any participant that passed
all six of the tasks presented in the Wellman and Liu (2004) ToM
scale. Participants received a score of 1 (successfully provided the
correct mental state explanation for a character’s behavior) or 0
(failed to provide correct mental state explanation) for each story,
yielding overall scores ranging from 0 to 9 on this measure. Scores
on the ToM Scale and Strange Stories were summed to create
a composite ToM score for youth across the given age range,
ranging from 0 to 15.
KBIT-2 (Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004)
The KBIT-2 is a measure of verbal IQ, non-verbal IQ, and Full
Scale IQ scores. It produces standard scores (M = 100, SD= 15).
The verbal IQ score was used to assess participant’s verbal ability
and ensure that each participant was of normally developed
intelligence (IQ > 85) and verbal ability (verbal IQ > 85). The
benefit of using the KBIT-2 is that it is faster to administer
than the more common Wechsler intelligence scales, while
still measuring both verbal and non-verbal cognitive functions
and providing a composite IQ score (Naugle et al., 1993).
Furthermore, research findings (Naugle et al., 1993) indicate that
scores from the KBIT are comparable to the Wechsler scales in
this age range, and construct validity was supported.
Toy Survey
Parents completed a survey in which they indicated their child’s
interest in and familiarity with each of the toys presented during
the play sessions. Parents rated interest and familiarity for all of
the toys on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) scale. This resulted in
12 ratings of familiarity and 12 ratings of interest (given the six
junk and six conventional toys). These ratings were averaged in
order to get an overall measure and gross approximation of each
participant’s familiarity and interest with these sets of toys.
Pretend Play Coding Scheme
The pretend play coding scheme was designed to code for
different types of play (No Play, Non-Symbolic Play, Pretend
Play) and, if pretending, subtype (OS, APP, IO; Libby et al., 1998).
No Play meant that a child was engaging in various types of
behavior, but that he or she was not playing (e.g., not attending
to objects, labeling objects, and looking at objects without acting
on them). Any type of play that could not be categorized as one
of the three types of pretend was coded as Non-Symbolic Play
(e.g., piling and stacking objects, spinning objects, tossing objects,
and banging objects). OS was defined as clearly using an object
as if it was another specific item (e.g., using the doll as a spoon,
using the car as a piece of food). APP was defined as indicating
the presence of features (i.e., color, size, abilities to talk) to an
object that deviated from the true features an object actually had.
These features could represent actual characteristics the object
could have or imaginary characteristics (e.g., walking the female
or male, and claiming the toy pan was hot). IO was defined as
acting as if an actual item that was not present in the room was
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in fact present. IO required the behavior to involve the presented
toys (i.e., could not involve talking to an imaginary friend), and
be explicit such that the coder could clearly identify each absent
object (e.g., eating imaginary food, stirring “something” in pan
or bowl). These definitions were chosen to maximize clarity that
target behaviors were observed, yielding conservative estimates of
each play type.
Pairs of coders, blind to each other’s scores as well as
the scores of the observed child on other measures, watched
5-min play sessions and coded the play in 15-s intervals,
similar to the procedure of Libby et al. (1998). The coding
team consisted of three undergraduate students naïve to study
hypotheses. Over a 2-month period, the team was trained
by reading the pretend play coding manual, attending weekly
meetings, practicing coding using training tapes, and reviewing
and discussing specific training intervals. ICCs were calculated
to assess reliability according to standards specified by Cicchetti
(1994). Coders were “certified” for coding once their ratings,
as a group, achieved acceptable scale level interrater reliability
[ICC(2,4)> 0.60] relative to master codes on 20 separate practice
tapes of child interactions with a variety of toys. Once coding
began, reliability assessments were performed and discussed
at weekly meetings to minimize coder drift (Margolin et al.,
1998).
All sessions were observed and double-coded for play type
(no play, non-symbolic play, pretend play) and, if pretending,
subtype (OS, APP, IO; Libby et al., 1998), yielding 62 pairs
of ratings. For each 15-s interval, play was coded for the
highest level of play in which participants engaged (From
lowest to highest; No Play, Non-Symbolic Play, Pretend Play).
If Pretend Play was selected, the subtype of pretend was also
coded. Subtype of pretend was based on which type of pretend
best characterized the interval. Each participant could have
engaged in any type of play, or subtype of pretend, yielding
scores of 0 to 20 for each play type and subtype, given
the 15-s intervals and the 5-min play session. We averaged
across the two 5-min play sessions (conventional and junk)
in order to obtain a sample of spontaneous pretend from
situations shown to elicit lesser and greater quantities and
qualities of pretend (McLoyd, 1983). This was then used to
determine each child’s “average” ability to produce actions of
pretend. Interrater reliability ICC(1,2) was excellent for No
Play (0.85), Non-Symbolic Play (0.83), Pretend Play (0.90), APP
(0.89), and IO (0.97), and was good for OS (0.63) (Cicchetti,
1994).
Data Analytic Plan
We first used descriptive analyses to assess amount of play
types and pretend play subtypes produced (No Play, Non-
Symbolic Play, Pretend Play, OS, APP, and IO), number
of ASD symptoms, verbal ability, ToM ability, and interest
in and familiarity with the toys. We then used bivariate
correlations to explore relations between continuous variables.
To test hypothesis 1, that children with more ASD symptoms
would engage in less spontaneous pretend overall, fewer
acts of APP and IO, and more acts of OS relative to
lower scoring participants, we examined the correlations
between play types and pretend subtypes compared to SCQ
scores.
To test hypothesis 2, that both well-established (verbal and
ToM abilities) and novel (interest and familiarity) factors would
relate positively to amount of overall pretend play, we looked
at the correlations between each factor and overall pretend. To
examine the sub-hypothesis that better ToM and verbal ability
would result in more instances of APP and IO and that more
interest in and familiarity with presented toys would result in
more instances of OS, we examined correlations between these
predictors and the respective pretend subtypes.
Our third hypothesis was that ToM and verbal ability would
show stronger relations to overall pretend among individuals
with fewer ASD symptoms compared to those with more
symptoms. The sub-hypothesis was that better ToM and verbal
ability would predict more instances of APP and IO for those with
fewer ASD symptoms compared to those with more symptoms.
To test these hypotheses, we ran hierarchical multiple regressions
predicting overall pretend, APP, and IO, with age and ASD status
on step 1, predictors (SCQ scores, ToM, verbal ability) on step
2, and the interactions between SCQ scores and age, ToM, and
verbal ability on step 3. Interactions were investigated with post
hoc probing (Holmbeck, 2002).
Our fourth hypothesis was that levels of interest in and
familiarity with presented toys would show stronger relations to
overall pretend among individuals with more ASD symptoms
compared to those with fewer symptoms. The sub-hypothesis
was that more interest in and familiarity with the presented
toys would result in more instances of OS for those participants
with more symptoms of ASD compared to those with fewer
symptoms. To test these hypotheses, we used the same overall
pretend regression model as for the third hypothesis (and ran an
identical model predicting OS), except we examined interactions
between interest, familiarity, and SCQ scores. Interactions were
again probed. For hypotheses 1, 3, and 4, significant effects were
probed by re-running analyses with the SCQ score replacing each
of its 3 subscales to determine which, if any, were driving the
effect.
RESULTS
Descriptives
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Participants displayed
normal intelligence and verbal ability, and a wide range of
interest in and familiarity with the toys. Participants also
displayed developmentally-appropriate ToM ability. Participants
ranged from having a history of 0 ASD symptoms to 26 ASD
symptoms; 15 symptoms is the screening cutoff for ASD. Play
scores indicate that participants’ play was characterized by
No Play about a third of the time, Non-Symbolic Play about
half the time, and Pretend Play about a fifth of the time.
However, most participants (±1 SD) engaged in 0–7 instances
of Pretend Play. In terms of subtypes of pretend, APP was
the most common and although OS was rare, it still made
up roughly a quarter of the observed instances of Pretend
Play.
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Bivariate Correlations
Table 2 presents correlations between continuous variables.
Older participants had better ToM, fewer instances of No Play,
and more instances of Non-Symbolic Play and APP. Older
participants also displayed more familiarity with the toys.
Participants with higher overall IQ and verbal IQ had less ASD
symptoms and better ToM. Participants with higher verbal IQ
(only) had more Non-Symbolic Play.
More ASD symptoms predicted less ToM, less familiarity with
the toys, more No Play, and less Non-Symbolic Play. Among all
participants, better ToM predicted less No Play and more Non-
Symbolic Play. Finally, more interest in the toys predicted more
OS. Subtypes of pretend play were not significantly correlated
with each other.
Hypothesis 1 –ASD Symptoms and
Pretend
No significant correlations were found between SCQ scores and
the amount of overall pretend produced or subtypes of pretend
produced (Table 2).
Hypothesis 2 – ToM, Verbal Ability, and
Interest and Familiarity and Pretend
Theory of mind, verbal ability, and interest and familiarity were
not shown to be predictors of overall pretend. However, better
ToM predicted more APP to the toys and more interest in the toys
predicted more OS with the toys. Familiarity and verbal ability
were not shown to be predictors of any pretend play subtypes
(Table 2).
Hypothesis 3 –ToM, Verbal ability, ASD
Symptoms and Pretend
Significant interactions were found between ASD symptoms and
VIQ (B = −0.014, p = 0.034), and ASD symptoms and ToM
(B= 0.18, p= 0.004) in predicting overall pretend play (Table 3).
An interaction was found between ASD symptoms and ToM
(B = 0.10, p = 0.021) in predicting IO (Table 4). Probing
indicated a negative relation between ToM and pretend play
among those with low SCQ (B = −1.74, p < 0.05; Figure 1)
and a marginally negative relation between VIQ and pretend
play among those with high SCQ (B = −0.13, p < 0.10). Effects
were consistent across subdomains of the SCQ, and were reduced
when excluding ASD participants.
Hypothesis 4 – Interest and Familiarity,
ASD Symptoms and Pretend
There was no interaction between SCQ scores and familiarity
in predicting overall pretend play or OS (both p > 0.56), or
between SCQ scores and interest in predicting overall pretend
play (p = 0.09). However, there was an interaction such that the
relation between interest and OS differed based on participants’
SCQ scores (Table 5, Model 2). Post hoc probing of this
interaction suggests that there was a positive relation between
interest and OS when SCQ scores were low (B = 1.35, p < 0.01)
and average (B= 0.57, p< 0.05; Figure 2).
Post hoc Analyses
Previous studies have reliably found that VIQ and ToM each
play a role in pretend play production. In the present study,
interactions were found between ASD symptoms and VIQ and
between ASD symptoms and ToM, indicating a negative relation
between VIQ and pretend play among those with more ASD
symptoms and a negative relation between ToM and pretend play
among those with fewer ASD symptoms. Given the surprising
relation in the opposite directions between ASD symptoms
and pretend play when taking into account these variables
separately, characterizing how these processes impact pretend
play outcomes may require one level of complexity higher than
typically analyzed. That is, jointly operating to influence the
relation between ASD symptoms and pretend play production.
Further probing of these effects while controlling for age revealed
that the effect of ASD symptoms on pretend play was moderated
simultaneously (i.e., double moderation) by VIQ (B = −0.01,
p = 0.03) and ToM (B = 0.18, p = 0.003). Post hoc analyses
showed that the negative relation between ASD symptoms and
pretend play was present only in those with low ToM and average
or high VIQ (B = −0.29, p = 0.005 and B = −0.49, p = 0.006,
respectively), as well as those with average ToM and high VIQ
(B = −0.25, p = 0.04; Figure 3). That is, lower ToM and higher
VIQ both related to less pretend play production among children
with more ASD symptoms.
DISCUSSION
The current study examined ASD symptoms, as well as ToM,
verbal ability, and interest in and familiarity with presented toys,
as potential predictors or moderators of overall pretend and
subtypes of pretend play spontaneously produced by children.
First, we hypothesized that measures of ASD symptoms
would correlate with overall pretend and subtypes of pretend
spontaneously produced, such that those with more ASD
symptoms would engage in fewer actions of overall pretend,
less APP and IO, and more OS. However, findings did not
support this hypothesis, as ASD symptoms did not correlate
with overall pretend or subtypes of pretend. Although, previous
studies have shown that the overall pretend and subtypes of
pretend differ between TD individuals and individuals with ASD
(Libby et al., 1998), these differences in pretend production were
not seen across children with varying degrees of ASD symptoms.
This suggests that although the number of ASD symptoms may
vary among TD children, this variance alone did not result in
differences in either the amount of overall pretend or subtypes
of pretend produced. It may be that a sufficient quantity of
ASD-related deficits is required before ASD symptoms influence
pretend ability.
Second, we hypothesized that established (ToM, verbal ability)
and novel (interest in and familiarity with the presented toys)
predictors of pretend would positively correlate with overall
pretend. Additionally, we hypothesized that better ToM and
verbal ability would result in more instances of APP and IO,
and that more interest in and familiarity with the presented toys
would result in more instances of OS.
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TABLE 2 | Correlations among continuous variables.
Age IQ SCQ VIQ ToM FAM INT NP NSP PP PP-OS PP-APP PP-IO
Age 1 0.27 −0.31 0.21 0.57∗∗ 0.38∗ −0.21 −0.49∗∗ 0.36∗ 0.26 −0.08 0.289 0.03
IQ 1 −0.38∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.15 0.10 −0.20 0.13 0.11 −0.14 0.13 0.06
SCQ 1 −0.53∗∗ −0.42∗∗ −0.46∗∗ −0.20 0.34∗ −0.41∗∗ −0.01 −0.01 0.19 −0.22
VIQ 1 0.57∗∗ 0.19 0.16 −0.31 0.37∗ 0.01 −0.05 −0.06 0.12
ToM 1 0.11 −0.08 −0.53∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.24 −0.14 0.32∗ 0.03
FAM 1 0.24 −0.12 0.15 −0.003 0.14 −0.25 0.23
INT 1 0.10 0.11 −0.24 0.37∗ −0.25 −0.20
NP 1 −0.59∗∗ −0.63∗∗ −0.23 −0.41∗∗ −0.27
NSP 1 −0.26 0.05 −0.18 −0.16
PP 1 0.22 0.68∗∗ 0.46∗∗
PP- OS 1 −0.10 −0.03
PP- APP 1 −0.25
PP- IO 1
∗p < 0.05, two-tailed; ∗∗p < 0.01, two-tailed. SCQ, Social Communication Questionnaire; VIQ, Verbal IQ; FAM, Familiarity; INT, Interest; ToM, Combined Theory of Mind
score (Theory of Mind Scale plus Strange Stories); NP, No Play; NSP, Non-Symbolic Play; PP, Pretend Play; PP-APP, Pretend Play-Attribution of Pretend Properties;
PP-OS, Pretend Play-Object Substitution; PP-IO, Pretend Play-Imaginary Objects.
TABLE 3 | Hierarchical multiple regression predicting amount of observed spontaneous pretend play.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B B
Age
ASD status
0.69
0.83
0.38
1.55
0.29
0.09
0.72
0.52
0.43
4.43
0.30
0.06
0.73
−1.78
0.51
4.71
0.31
−0.19
SCQ VIQ
ToM
0.01
0.00
−0.12
0.20
0.05
0.53
0.02
0.01
−0.05
0.80
0.07
−1.61
0.76
0.06
0.67
1.64
0.29
−0.60∗
SCQ× age
SCQ× VIQ
SCQ× ToM
0.02
−0.01
0.18
0.06
0.01
0.06
0.16
−2.72∗
1.30∗∗
Total R2 0.08 0.08 0.35
F for 1R2 1.63 0.02 4.23∗
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. ASD status, binary variable, confirmed using Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 1999); SCQ, Social Communication
Questionnaire (Rutter et al., 2005); VIQ, Verbal Intelligence Quotient (from KBIT-2; Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004); ToM, Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman and Liu, 2004).
TABLE 4 | Hierarchical multiple regression predicting imaginary objects subtype of pretend play.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B B
Age
ASD
status
−0.02
−1.19
0.28
1.11
−0.01
−18.0
0.09
−0.42
0.28
2.90
0.06
−0.06
0.3
−0.37
0.36
3.35
0.20
−0.06
SCQ VIQ
ToM
−0.09
0.02
−0.83
0.13
0.03
0.35
−0.27
0.11
−0.44
0.18
0.04
−1.65
0.54
0.04
0.48
0.54
0.23
−0.88∗∗
SCQ× age
SCQ× VIQ
SCQ× ToM
−0.04
−0.004
0.10
0.04
0.005
0.04
−0.56
−1.17
1.03∗
Total R2 0.03 0.19 0.32
F for 1R2 0.59 2.28 1.99
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. ASD status, binary variable, confirmed using Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 1999); SCQ, Social Communication
Questionnaire (Rutter et al., 2005); VIQ, Verbal Intelligence Quotient (from KBIT-2; Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004); ToM, Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman and Liu, 2004).
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FIGURE 1 | Values below 0 are model-predicted values. Interaction
between Social Communication Questionnaire [SCQ; i.e., history of many
versus few autism spectrum disorder (ASD) symptoms] and theory of mind
(ToM) Scale scores predicting amount of observed pretend play. Among those
with low SCQ, a negative relation was found between ToM and pretend play.
∗p < 0.05. Low = 1 SD below sample mean. High = 1 SD above sample
mean.
While previous studies have found compelling links between
ToM ability and pretend (Taylor and Carlson, 1997), the
current study found that, whereas better ToM was not
correlated with overall pretending, it was linked to more
instances of APP. This finding suggests that ToM ability
might contribute more to engaging in and understanding
certain types pretend. Furthermore, it is interesting that this
link was only found with APP and not IO or OS. When
engaging in actions of APP, children explore what else an
object can do. Thus, both ToM and APP involve ascribing
novel capacities to people (i.e., ability to know something they
might otherwise not) and to objects (i.e., the ability to do
something that they might otherwise not). This suggests that
rather than emanating from a basic metarepresentation ability
(Leslie, 1987), both ToM ability and the ability to attribute
pretend properties may stem from a common metaattribution
ability.
Additionally, more interest in the toys was linked to more
OS. Interest in the toys was explored as a novel predictor
of pretend and pretend subtypes on the basis that children
might be more motivated to engage in higher levels of
play, like pretend, if they were more motivated to play with
the presented toys. Past literature suggests that interest in
objects drives the play behaviors in which children choose to
engage (Hidi et al., 2004). The finding that interest correlated
with more OS suggests that those with more interest in the
presented toys may engage in more holistic exploration of
them. Holistic exploration means that children explore the
characteristics of the entire object (e.g., toy car) rather than
focusing on individual features of that object (e.g., wheels).
OS may reflect such holistic exploration, as it is a subtype
of pretend that involves exploring what else the whole object
can be (in contrast to the other two types, which involve
exploration of what else an object can do [APP] and what
outside associations can be made [IO]). Whole OS is also
more likely to be related to its shape (Smith and Jones,
2011), which translates to sensitivity to its spatial characteristics.
This finding also indicates that interest in toys might play
a previously unexamined role in the development of the
ability to pretend among children. Interestingly, our results
suggest that although interest may relate to the ability to
engage in OS, the influence of interest may vary across
different ASD symptomatology. Contrary to our hypothesis,
while more interest in the presented toy is related to more
OS among those with few or average ASD symptoms, no
such relation was found between interest and OS among
those with more ASD symptoms. High interest in specific toys
may be related to broader cognitive rigidity (e.g., insistence
on sameness, resistance to change) in children with greater
ASD symptomatology (Carcani-Rathwell et al., 2006) and may
interfere with the ability to consider the toy as a different
object.
Thus, ToM and interest in the toys predicted distinct,
hypothesized subtypes of pretend. These findings highlight the
importance of directly examining and understanding different
TABLE 5 | Hierarchical multiple regression predicting object substitution subtype of pretend play.
Model 1 Model 2
B SE B β B SE B β
SCQ
ToM
VIQ
FAM
INT
−0.01
−0.03
−0.01
0.12
0.66
0.04
0.07
0.02
0.39
0.31
−0.05
−0.08
−0.10
0.06
0.36∗
−0.20
0.05
−0.03
−0.16
1.45
0.43
0.10
0.03
0.53
0.51
−1.16
0.13
−0.36
−0.7
0.79∗∗
SCQ× ToM
SCQ× VIQ
SCQ× FAM
SCQ× INT
−0.01
0.004
0.08
−0.16
0.02
0.003
0.11
0.07
−0.32
1.95
1.52
−2.21∗
Total R2 0.40 0.54
F for 1R2 1.31 1.35
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. ASD status, binary variable, confirmed using Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 1999); SCQ, Social Communication
Questionnaire (Rutter et al., 2005); VIQ, Verbal Intelligence Quotient (from KBIT-2; Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004); ToM, Theory of Mind Scale (Wellman and Liu, 2004);
FAM, Familiarity; INT, Interest; SCQ × FAM, Interaction between familiarity with toys and SCQ; SCQ × INT, Interaction between interest in toys and SCQ.
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FIGURE 2 | Relation between level of interest in toys and observed
instances of object substitution (OS) based on high, average, or low
scores on the Social Communication Questionnaire [SCQ; i.e., autism
spectrum disorder (ASD) symptoms]. While there was a positive relation
between interest and quantity of OS for those with a history of few or average
ASD symptoms, this relation was not found for those with a history of more
ASD symptoms. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. Low = 1 SD below sample mean.
Average = sample mean. High = 1 SD above sample mean.
types of pretend. This, in conjunction with our finding that
pretend subtypes were not significantly correlated with each
other, further stresses the importance of dissociating subtypes of
pretend.
Conversely, although previous literature has suggested a link
between verbal ability and pretend among TD individuals (Lewis
et al., 2000; Rutherford and Rogers, 2003) findings from the
current study indicated that verbal ability did not predict overall
pretend or subtypes of pretend produced. However, previous
literature has used much younger samples of TD participants;
for example, all of Rutherford and Rogers’ (2003) participants
were younger than 4 years old and Lewis et al.’s (2000) ranged
in age from 1 to 6. Furthermore, our findings are consistent
with previous literature that did not find a relation between
verbal ability and pretend production among certain samples,
such as individuals with ASD (Rutherford and Rogers, 2003).
This suggests that although verbal ability may relate to the ability
to produce actions of pretend it is possible that verbal ability’s
influence varies across populations and diminishes with age.
Additionally, the current study used a more conservative measure
to code pretend in order to ensure that coders were certain
that each instance of pretend coded was in fact pretend. Thus,
it is possible that the link between verbal ability and pretend
disappears when more rigorous, conservative measures are used
to assess pretend play (Lillard et al., 2013).
Familiarity with the toys was also not shown to predict either
overall pretend or pretend subtypes. Whereas past literature
has suggested that more familiarity with toys indicates better
FIGURE 3 | Simultaneous moderation by ToM and verbal ability (VIQ)
on the relation between ASD symptoms and pretend play. More ASD
symptoms related to less pretend play production when ToM was low and VIQ
was average or high, and when ToM was average and VIQ was high. All other
relations were non-significant. The negative relation between ASD symptoms
and pretend play was especially pronounced among those with low ToM and
high verbal ability. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. Low = 1 SD below sample mean.
Average = sample mean. High = 1 SD above sample mean.
knowledge and understanding of the characteristics of those
toys (Hidi et al., 2004), the current study’s findings suggest that
perhaps familiarity does not induce participants to engage in
pretend with presented toys. That is, knowing what a toy is may
not be sufficient to prompt greater exploration of it as an object
with which to pretend.
Third, we hypothesized that the links between ToM, verbal
ability and overall pretend produced would be stronger for
those with fewer ASD symptoms compared to those with
more symptoms. We also hypothesized that better ToM and
verbal ability would result in more instances of APP and
IO for those with fewer ASD symptoms compared to those
with more symptoms. However, no significant interaction was
found. Perhaps this was because the current study looked at
ASD symptoms within TD children rather than conducting a
direct comparison between TD children and children with ASD.
Again, it may be that it takes a sufficient quantity of ASD-
related deficits before these ASD symptoms are able to highlight
distinct differences in the way ToM and verbal ability influence
production of pretend.
Finally, we hypothesized that the links between interest in and
familiarity with toys and overall pretend produced would differ
based on ASD symptoms, such that these relations would be
stronger for those with more ASD symptoms compared to those
with fewer symptoms. We also hypothesized that more interest
in and familiarity with the presented toys would result in more
instances of OS for those with more symptoms of ASD compared
to those with fewer symptoms. Although we again found no effect
for familiarity, there was an interaction such that the relation
between interest and OS differed based on SCQ scores. Contrary
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to our hypothesis, while there was a positive relation between
interest and OS across the sample, this relation was stronger when
SCQ scores were low. As noted by the weak central coherence
(WCC) theory, youth with ASD (as well as TD youth with more
ASD symptoms) tend to demonstrate a detail-focused cognitive
style, and have consequent difficulty seeing the “big picture”
in various contexts (Happe and Frith, 2006). More holistic
exploration (i.e., OS) with a toy may be seen as a play-based
behavioral indicator of such “big picture” engagement. Thus,
this finding is consistent with the WCC theory, as it suggests
that individuals with more ASD symptoms might tend toward
relatively more detail-focused engagement with toys rather than
the holistic type of play reflected in OS. This is also consistent
with recent work (Russell-Smith et al., 2012) indicating a relation
between detail-focused cognitive style and ASD-like impairments
in social development in TD individuals. This result further
highlights the importance of considering subtypes of pretend play
when examining its relation to cognitive development, and future
work should explore this intriguing link between OS and features
related to ASD.
Additionally, post hoc analyses indicated that developmental
delays in communication, but not reciprocal interaction or
restrictive repetitive behaviors, seemed to drive this relation.
This finding, along with the finding of no interaction between
verbal ability and SCQ scores in predicting pretend, suggests that
historical (rather than current) impairments in development of
communication ability might prevent children from being able to
connect their interest in toys to pretending in very sophisticated
ways with the toys (i.e., OS). However, while the interaction effect
for communication was larger than either reciprocal interaction
or restrictive repetitive behaviors, it is important to note that
the interaction was only marginally significant. Thus, it appears
that aggregate ASD symptoms appear to best account for this
effect.
Results suggest that, while ASD symptoms are not a predictor
of spontaneous pretend play on their own, there are unexpected
negative relations between ToM and pretend play associated
with ASD symptoms, as well as between VIQ and pretend play
associated with ASD symptoms. Given the reliable findings in
previous studies of relations between each of these variables,
it is important to consider the role that ToM and VIQ can
play simultaneously in pretend play production in children with
varying degree of ASD symptoms. Specifically, the predicted
negative relation between ASD symptoms and pretend play was
more pronounced in those with low ToM ability and high verbal
ability. Previous inconsistent findings in relations of VIQ, ToM,
and pretend play may be related to variability in ASD symptoms
in sampled populations, and it is notable that the relation between
ASD symptoms and pretend play was clarified in the current
study only by examining effects of ToM and VIQ together on
such relation. Whereas, ability to pretend are both require the
ability to be metarepresentational (Leslie, 1987), verbal ability
may not require metarepresentational capacity (Breheny, 2001)
and may involve non-metarepresentational diversion of cognitive
resources. For example, this may help explain the pattern of play
seen in children with ASD who presents with good verbal ability
(e.g., those who are hyperlexic or hyperverbal; Grigorenko et al.,
2002) but show poor ToM and show difficulties with pretend play
production.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although this study provided a novel inquiry into predictors of
spontaneous pretend play in children with and without ASD,
there are (as always) several limitations. First, the sample size was
relatively small, and while this study examined ASD symptoms in
TD youth and ASD youth, the ASD sub-sample was very small.
Thus, it cannot strongly support any contention that observed
findings relate to ASD symptoms and not other factors (e.g.,
delays in communication development) to which the employed
measures may be sensitive. Likewise, if deficits in pretend play are
truly specific to those who meet diagnostic criteria for ASD (i.e.,
are pathognomonic), then this study would be underpowered to
detect the hypothesized severity-related effects, even if they were
present. Thus, future studies should explore the same predictors
(ToM, verbal ability, familiarity, and interest) with a bigger
sample with greater variability in ASD symptoms in order to
reveal the relations between these variables more clearly.
Second, the age of participants was fairly broad, ranging from
age 4 to age 8. Indeed, the types of play that children engage
in across these ages do tend to vary (Johnson, 1998). Because
of the relatively wide age range, and consequently diverse forms
of play emerging across the age range, there is a possibility that
different play behaviors were categorized similarly by the coding
system. Future studies should examine narrower age ranges in
larger samples in order to develop richer picture of how and
what pretend play looks like in this paradigm at specific points
in development.
Third, we used a measure that provided only a rough
approximation of past history of ASD symptoms. The SCQ is a
measure of historical ASD symptoms, not present. Thus, future
studies should employ continuous measures of contemporaneous
ASD symptoms, such as the Autism Spectrum Quotient –
Children’s Version (AQ-Child; Auyeung et al., 2008) or the Social
Responsiveness Scale-2 (SRS-2; Constantino and Gruber, 2012)
to obtain a current measure of ASD symptoms.
Fourth, the pretend play coding scheme was a novel system for
coding pretend play and play type. While the system proved to be
reliable and rigorous, it is difficult to make direct comparisons
to past studies that also looked at production of pretend play
but used different measures. Future studies should use similar
systems when coding actions of pretend play and play type with
toys to determine if similar findings occur. Future studies should
also examine differences in pretend play patterns as driven by
interest and familiarity in a specific toy. This will not only serve
as a validity check for the procedure itself (i.e., do children
whose parents identify dolls as toy with highest interested and
familiarity show pretend play with dolls the most) but also
augment the utility of this novel paradigm.
Finally, the system we created for coding pretend play and
play type also used a very conservative estimate of pretend. We
chose to take a more conservative approach to coding pretend
to ensure that coders were absolutely certain an action with
the toys was pretend before coding it. However, by taking this
more conservative approach, it is possible that certain instances
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of pretend were missed, especially for subtypes of pretend with
low frequency of occurrence like OS. Taken together, this study
would benefit from replication to further support the unexpected
findings.
Clinical and Theoretical Implications
This was the first study to examine the relation between ASD
symptoms in children across typical and atypical development
and observed spontaneous pretend play. It was the first to
examine the relation between novel predictors (interest in and
familiarity with presented toys) and pretend play. Finally, it was
one of the first to carefully consider predictors of differences in
subtypes of pretend.
One of the strengths of the current study was that it
presented a new system for coding and assessing pretend
play and play types with different toys. This coding system,
while novel, proved to be a rigorous, conservative, reliable
measure of play type using blinded raters (a crucial, under-
represented approach in this literature; see Lillard et al.,
2013), and may prove to be a useful measure for future
research studies aiming to code play type with objects. Indeed,
based on the methodological strengths of this measure, these
results can be seen to shed new light on the prediction of
pretend.
This study suggests that ASD symptoms are not, on their own,
a predictor of spontaneous play with toys in children. However,
our results highlight the importance of how varying degree of
ASD symptoms may interact with child’s verbal ability and ToM
to influence production of pretend play. It also suggests that
abnormal play behaviors may be truly unique to those meeting
criteria for ASD at differing levels of ToM and verbal ability, and
may thus provide a valuable indicator of deficits and treatment
response within this population based on individual profile of
cognitive abilities.
This study also suggests that supposedly established predictors
of pretend (verbal ability and ToM) do not appear to relate
to pretending when a more rigorous measure is applied,
indicating that these relations in previous studies may be due to
experimenter effects (as suggested by Lillard et al., 2013). On the
other hand, that ToM related to a theoretically-similar subtype of
pretend (APP) suggests that pretending may be a more complex,
multifaceted construct, and that consideration of subtypes may
provide a better window into play.
Additionally, this study suggests that interest in toys might be
an important predictor of certain subtypes of pretend, specifically
OS, that until now have gone unexamined. Furthermore, the
finding that interest was a strong predictor of OS among
participants, and that this relation differed based on number
of ASD symptoms, suggests that interest might prove to be a
predictor of pretend among individuals with ASD.
Finally, that interest in toys predicts OS suggests possible
implications regarding how certain types of pretend might
develop among children. For instance, interest in an object might
lead to holistic exploration of that object, which in turn may
result in a child exploring (and pretending) what else that object
can be (OS). Findings regarding the subtypes of pretend provide
deeper insight into the factors that influence the development of
the ability to pretend. By gaining a better understanding of what
factors contribute to the development of pretend among both TD
children and ASD populations, we are better able to understand
why some individuals (such as those with ASD) might have
difficulty with certain types of pretend and how pretend might
develop differently among these individuals.
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